

TRADITIONAL ULAMA MOVEMENT AGAINST INVADERS: DARUL ULOOM DEOBAND, INDIA AND PESANTREN TEBUIRENG, INDONESIA

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Abstract: This article attempts to describe the role of ulama (Islamic Scholars) of Darul Uloom Deoband in India and those of Pesantren Tebuireng Jombang in Indonesia, who are categorized as traditionalist, in the independence movement against the invaders. The ulama of Darul Uloom Deoband opposed to the British rule, while the ulama of Tebuireng struggled against the Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation. Using a historical approach, this article reveals that traditionalist scholars in both institutions had a significant role in the independence movement, even though Islam is minority in India and majority in Indonesia. They fostered anti-colonial attitudes against the invaders in order to defend their homeland and fight for their country's independence.

Keywords: Darul Uloom Deoband; Pesantren Tebuireng; nationalism; struggle for independence.

Introduction

Since the 16th century, Europeans including the Portuguese, Spanish, English and Dutch began traveling to various countries in the Eastern Hemisphere to trade. In fact, not only did they carry out economic activities, but they also sought to expand and colonize countries that have abundant economic resources. They then sought to seize control of not only economic resources but also governments and territory. The Portuguese and Dutch colonized Indonesia for a long time, while India was ruled by the British, like many other Eastern countries that could not be separated from the colonization of the Western nations.

Long-standing economic and political domination by the colonial nation left colonized countries poor, marginalized and

persecuted. This then triggered resistance from the indigenous people to the invaders. The resistance began around the mid-19th to early 20th centuries. This period is a momentum in many colonized countries to fight in order to break free from colonialists. These efforts do not necessarily happen, but need a long process, including the emergence of social and religious organizations and of nationalism reflected through, for instance, the physical independence movement and diplomacy.

This research wants to describe the role of ulama from two well-known traditional Islamic educational institutions; Darul Uloom Deoband, India, and Pesantren Tebuireng, Indonesia. The term 'traditional institution' means that ulama from these two institutions generally want to maintain or to safeguard Islamic values through curriculum and learning system determined independently and traditionally. Furthermore, in this respect, the scholars of the two institutions refuse to adopt any intervention of the invaders (British and Dutch) who were considered as enemies that must be fought in order to seize independence.

Scholars who have concerns about all forms of movement in India have been more interested in writing about the Aligarh educational movement which is considered more modern, innovative, and dynamic. Aligarh was pioneered by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.¹ Writings on the movement for education reform in Aligarh including the role of its central figure, Sir Syed, are very widely found. Two of them are written by Muhammad entitled *Writings and Speeches of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan*² and *Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: A Political Biography*.³ Smith also paid attention to the modernist

¹ Sayyid Ahmad Khan was born in Delhi on October 17, 1817 to a family that had an important position in the Mughal government. He studied in traditional Islamic education under the guidance of Shah Ghulam 'Ali, a shaykh of the Naqshabandiyah Order, and of Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz, a well-known ulama in Delhi. He was involved in the British colonial government since 1838 as *saristbadar* (scribe). G.F.I. Graham, *The Life and Works of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974), 1; Ruswan Thoyib, "Kolonialisme dan Pembaruan Pendidikan Islam di India dan Indonesia," in Doddy S. Truna and Ismatu Ropi, *Pranata Islam di Indonesia: Pergulatan Sosial, Politik, Hukum dan Pendidikan* (Jakarta: Logos, 2002), 243-271.

² Shan Muhammad, *Writings and Speeches of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan* (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications Limited, 1972).

³ Shan Muhammad, *Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: A Political Biography* (Meerut: Meenakshi Praksahan, 1969).

movement in India as expressed in his book entitled *Modern Islam in India*.⁴

On the contrary, the role of the traditional ulama has not been written in its entirety but only fragments in the article or book chapters. There are several scholarly works, according to the author's observation, which discuss specifically about the role of Indian traditional ulama in education and the independence movement. They are, among others, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* written by Faruqi,⁵ *Islamic Revival in British India Deoband, 1860-1900* and "The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious in Modern India" by Metcalf.⁶ An Indian scholar who has also interest in writing the role of Deoband ulama is Tabassum who wrote *Deoband Ulama's Movement for the Freedom of India*.⁷

In the case of Indonesia, the movements among the traditional people led by Tebuireng ulama, notably KH. Hasyim Asy'ari and KH. Wahid Hasyim, are almost never "touched" by scholars. Instead, Geertz labeled the organization of traditional ulama, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), as "anti-modernism;"⁸ Benda characterizes NU with a negative label, i.e. organizations that "contra reformism;"⁹ and Wertheim attributed NU such negative attributes as "conservative" and "orthodox" organization.¹⁰ In fact, der Mehden wrote the role of such traditional organizations in the

⁴ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1947).

⁵ Ziya-ul Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963).

⁶ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India Deoband, 1860-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, n.d.); Barbara D. Metcalf, "The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious in Modern India," *Modern Islamic Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1978), 111-134.

⁷ Farhat Tabassum, *Deoband Ulama's Movement for the Freedom of India* (New Delhi: Jamiat Ulama-I-Hind, 2006).

⁸ Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1960), 228-249; Clifford Geertz, *The Religio of Java* (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

⁹ Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1983).

¹⁰ W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesia Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1966).

frame of stereotypes and biases. He stated that “the influence of NU on the national movement was more negative than positive.”¹¹

From this background, the author tried to explore the role of traditionalists in the independence movement in their respective countries. This research, as mentioned above, focused on the role of the traditionalist ulama from Darul Uloom Deoband, India and Pesantren Tebuireng Jombang, Indonesia, and then tried to compare the role of them in fostering nationalism among Indian and Indonesian Muslims to make movements against invaders. This study took data from primary sources as well as secondary ones that can fully describe about the independence movement led by ulama of Darul Uloom and Pesantren Tebuireng. As for data analysis, the author applied a historical research method. This research methods are actually instruments for reconstructing historical events (history as past actuality) into history as a story (history as written).¹² The author follows Garaghan’s pattern in his book, *A Guide to Historical Method*, which compiles historical methods in four parts, namely: understanding the history, search and discovery of sources, reviewing sources, and presenting research results.¹³

The Role of Deobandi Ulama in the Independence Movement in India

Since the Mughal Empire fell and Sultan Tipu (1799) was assassinated by British soldiers, much of India has been controlled by invaders. British territory was expanded by the victory of the Maratha wars (1803-5) and the agreement of peace between Ranjit Singh and the British army. With the agreement, the supremacy of Muslims has generally fallen.

¹¹ Fred R. Von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia: Burma, Indonesia the Philippines* (Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 138 and 202.

¹² Historical facts are an important theme since R.G. Collingwood, the father of modern historical science, in the early 20th century introduced a pattern of historical writing that has been theorized and mechanized so that writing of an event in the past can be expected to be closer to the truth by maintaining the principles of objectivity possessed.

¹³ Gilbert J. Garaghan, *A Guide to Historical Method* (Wisconsin: The Cornwall Press, 1946).

This condition inspired traditionalist ulama, among others, Shah Abdul Aziz to issue a fatwa in 1803 declaring that India was no longer *Dār al-Islām*. The consequence of the fatwa was to invite Indian Muslims to mobilize themselves against foreign powers. The contents of some fatwas originally written in Persian are as follows:

...in this city (Delhi) the Imam al-Muslimin wields no authority. The real power rests with Christian officers. There is no check on them; and the promulgation of the command of '*kufr*' means that in administration and justice, in matters of law and order, in the domain of trade, finance and collection of revenues—everywhere the '*kufr*' (infidels) are in power ... It is in their own interests if they do not object to travelers and traders to visit the city. On the other hand, distinguished persons like Shujā' al-Mulk and Vilayeti Begum dare visit the city without their permission. From here (Delhi) to Calcutta the Christians are in complete control...¹⁴

The fatwa was issued in Shah Sahib's view after analyzing the situation and referring to the legal position and examples that occurred in the early days of Islamic history. Thus, India is no longer a land of peace and security for both Muslims and for the *dhimmī*. In summary, after quoting what Sahib said, W.W. Hunter said:

When infidels get hold of a Muhammadan country ... and it becomes impossible for the Musalman of the country, and of the people of the neighboring district, to drive them away or retain reasonable hope of ever doing so; and the power of the infidels increases to such extent that they can abolish or retain the ordinances of Islam according to their pleasure; and no is strong enough to seize on the revenues of the country without the permission of the infidels; and the (Musalman) inhabitants do no longer live so secure as before; such a country is politically a Country of the Enemy (*Dār al-Harb*)¹⁵

Since the issuance of the fatwa, there have been a lot of resistances by the ulama, including the Balakot Rebellion in 1831 which killed one of the respected ulama, Sayyid Ahmad.¹⁶ The

¹⁴ Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, 2.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., 9.

rebellion to expel the British from Indian territory continued to be stirred by ulama. One of the great uprisings involving tens of thousands of Muslims was the Shamli/Mutiny uprising that took place in 1857.¹⁷ Many ulama were involved and called for *jihad* against the British identified with *kufri*. Mutiny's rebellion was actually the accumulative impact of the British's restraint on Indian Muslims in the political, social, and economic spheres. However, this rebellion ended in failure and the British remained in control of India.

Nevertheless, the role of ulama to fight for independence continued to struggle. One of the efforts made was to shift the strategy from direct gun contact to "pen" weapon contact by establishing Darul Uloom Deoband. In addition, in the field of politics, the role of traditionalist ulama in India remained continuous. The momentum that inspired scholars to bounce back was the Khilafat Movement. The movement was behind the meeting of traditional ulama and Muslim scholars (Western educated Muslims) to establish Jam'iyat Ulama Hindi in 1919.

In addition to bringing together the two camps of Muslims in the Jam'iyat Ulama Hindi forum, Khilafat Movement, led by Abu Kalam Azad and Ali Brothers, Muhammad and Syaikat, was the beginning of the meeting of Islamic and Hindu groups in India. Through the Khilafat Movement, nationalism emerged among Indians both Hindus and Muslims to fight together against the British. Gandhi himself realized that the issue of Khilafat Movement can be used as a tool to unite Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi provided aid to Muslims as well as he wished Muslims could come together against the British. Gandhi's hopes finally came true with the acceptance of Muslims for Gandhi's leadership against the British.¹⁸

The Jam'iyat Ulama Hindi organization was established with the aim of maintaining shari'ah and providing religious and political instructions to Muslims in accordance with Islamic

¹⁷ Sheila McDonough, "The Religious Legitimization of Change among Modernist in Indo-Pakistani Islam," in Bardwell L. Smith, *Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978) 43.

¹⁸ Christine Maitland, "Prelude to Partition: An Analysis of the Sources of Hindu-Muslim Discord" (M.A. Thesis--California State University, 1973), 93.

principles. The purposes of the organization as set out in its constitution are as follows:

- 1 To guide the followers of Islam in their political and non-political matters from a religious point of view.
- 2 To defend on shar'ī grounds, Islam, centers of Islam (the Jazīrat al-ʿArab and the seat of the Khilafat), Islamic rituals and customs and Islamic nationalism against all odds to them.
- 3 To achieve and protect the general religious and national rights of the Muslim.
- 4 To organize the ulama on a common platform.
- 5 To organize the Muslim community and launch a program for its moral and social reform.
- 6 To establish good and friendly relations with non-Muslim of the country to the extent permitted by the *Shariʿat al-Islāmīyah*.
- 7 To fight for the freedom of the country and religion according to the shar'ī objectives.
- 8 To establish *maḥākim al-Sharʿīyah* (religious courts) to meet the religious needs of the community.
- 9 To propagate Islam, by way of missionary activities, in India a foreign land.
- 10 To maintain and strengthen the bond of unity and fraternal relation (as ordained by Islam) with the Muslim of other countries.¹⁹

In 1939, items no. 2, 7, 8 and 9 were amended and replaced as follows:

- 2 To protect Islam, centers of Islam (Hijaz and Jazīrat al-ʿArab) and Islamic rites and usages, and defend Islamic nationalism against all odds injurious to it.
- 7 Complete independence for the nation and the country according to sharīʿah.
- 8 To organize the *Millat al-Islāmīyah* into a shar'ī body and establish *maḥākim al-Sharʿīyah*.
- 9 To work for the religious, educational, moral, social and economic reforms of the Muslims, and to propagate Islam, by way of missionary activities in India to their best ability.²⁰

¹⁹ Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, 68-69.

²⁰ Ibid., 63.

Based on the purpose of the establishment of Jam'iyat Ulama Hindi above, it is understandable that there are two loyalties held by Muslims, namely loyalty to Islam and the Islamic state on the one hand, and to the Indian state on the other. It was this goal that nourished Indian nationalism among Muslims and that united Muslims and Hindus under Gandhi with his non-cooperation movement towards Britain.

Cooperation that has been well established will experience a rift when there are certain interests. Hindu groups under Gandhi's leadership did not accommodate the interests of India's minority Muslims. It is understandable that Hindus as the majority of Congress certainly prioritized their interests and ignored, even suppressed, those of the minority Muslims. What was unacceptable among scholars was that they had never been invited to talk about the concept of the state that was being fought. Gandhi's deeply-held concept of traditional Hindu tolerance made the Hindu-majority Congress a platform to fight over the interests of their respective groups: capitalists, socialists, progressives, communalists and others.

In addition to Islam and Hinduism, a gap between Muslims themselves, namely between traditionalist ulama and Muslim scholars, also occurred. The Muslim League, which was the basis of Muslim scholars, did not fight for the interests of Muslims as a whole. In its Congress, members of the league only thought of their own groups, the mostly middle-class (bourgeois) Muslims.

This condition led to mutual distrust between Muslims in the Muslim League and traditional ulama. Traditional ulama were considered unprepared to follow the steps of Muslim scholars who received Western education. The patterns and behaviors of Muslim League members indicated cultural differences with traditional clerical groups in grasping the values of previous Islamic traditions. Miyan said: "The situation is that in matters of daily behavior and culture the western educated class, both Hindu and Muslim, has accepted a new culture and have discarded their own cultural norms. This new culture is so uniform that hardly any distinction can be made between Hindus and the Muslims."²¹

In addition to the issue of cultural differences that were feared by traditionalist ulama, differences in political views were also the

²¹ Ibid., 76.

cause of the fracture of their relationship. Muslim League leaders argued that traditionalist ulama did not have the ability to be leaders in the context of state politics. This was because: firstly, traditionalist ulama only received education from traditional institutions; secondly, they did not care about the complexity of modern life; and thirdly, traditionalist ulama did not understand the political character of the 20th century.²² The above background then led the Jam'iyat and the Muslim League to no longer be united. They did not trust each other even though on one occasion they also helped each other to fight for the interests of Muslims. This situation had continued until 1940 when the Muslim League proposed establishing the state of Pakistan.

On 23 March 1940, the Muslim League under Jinnah proposed establishing a new state so that Muslims were separated and no longer a minority group. The Muslim League expressly stated the need for separation from India for Muslims so that they would become the majority group in the new country they aspired to. To realize these ideals, the Muslim League proclaimed a slogan *Pakistan ka Matlabkya? Lā ilāha illā Allāh*, 'What does Pakistan represent? There is no god but Allah.'²³ This motto can tempt the spirit of Indian Muslims to support the Muslim League to realize the establishment of the state of Pakistan.

In Jinnah's view, in the Indian sub-continent there are two main nations each of which is entitled to their own homeland. Jinnah stated:

We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, custom and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life.²⁴

Addressing the Muslim League leader's desire to separate and establish the Pakistani state, most of traditionalist Deobandi ulama

²² Ibid., 78.

²³ Rashid Khalidi, "Pakistan," in John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 3 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 287.

²⁴ Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, 94.

who belonged to Jam'iyat Ulama Hindi opposed to the separation of India, although at the same time there was a desire to regulate in law the interests of Muslims in maintaining religious culture and values. In an Indian Muslim conference held in April 1940, a declaration was produced. The declaration decided essentially: firstly, India is geographically and politically the common property of Hindus and Muslims and both have the same right to fight for independence; secondly, the Indian constitution will provide protection towards the interests of Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the representatives of Muslims in the constituent Assembly; thirdly, there is a feeling of satisfaction from various parties, especially Hindus towards the aspirations of Muslims included in the law.²⁵

In 1942, Jam'iyat Ulama Hindi issued a decree known as the Jam'iyat Formula which contained:

1. Our object is complete independence.
2. In a free India, Musalman and their religion and culture will be free. They will not accept a constitution which does not approve of these freedoms.
3. We stand for the fullest and unrestricted autonomy of the provinces. The center will enjoy only those powers which provinces, of their own accord, hand over to it and which concerns equally with all provinces.
4. It is our considered opinion that a federation of autonomous provinces of India is essential. But a federation in which ninety million Muslims with a distinct culture are left on the mercy of a numerical majority, will, in no case, be acceptable to them; the center is to be formed on such principles that give a clear guarantee to the Muslim with regard to their religious, cultural, and political freedom.²⁶

From the decisions issued by traditionalist ulama there are clearly different things compared to the Muslim League. Traditionalist ulama rejected the two nations doctrine as proposed by the Muslim League. They still stuck to the concept of *muttahiḍah qawmīyah* (United Indian Nationalism). This means that they rejected the Muslim League's proposal to separate themselves

²⁵ Ibid., 97-98.

²⁶ Ibid., 99-100.

from India by establishing a Pakistani state. This decision was taken based on the explanation of Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī who stated:

We inhabitants of India, in so far as we are Indians, have one thing in common and that is our Indianness which remains unchanged in spite of our religious and cultural differences. As the diversities in our appearance, individual qualities and personal traits and color and stature do not affect our common humanness, similarly our religious and cultural differences do not interfere with our common associations with our homeland. ...This duty which arises out of our common sharing in the happiness and misery of our homeland, is obligatory on all. Religious differences, in no case, serve as an impediment in the way of fulfilling this obligation. This is what I mean by the '*muttaḥidah qawmiyah*' ...²⁷

The difference that also underlies the rejection of India's separation by traditionalist ulama is the suspicion of Jinnah's request for assistance to the British colonial government to realize the founding of the Pakistani state. The suspicion among these ulama was based on Jinnah's appointment by the British as an Indian representation in the News Chronicle in London on 29 February 1944. In addition to being appointed as a representation, Jinnah also stated that British troops would not leave India until the state was safe both in India and in the new country, Pakistan.²⁸

There is even suspicion among the traditionalist ulama of that the intellectual actor of India's secession is actually British. Even if this last point is true, of course this is unfortunate for traditionalist ulama. The things done by modern Muslims (Muslim League) was certainly contrary to the principle of traditionalist scholars who clearly opposed all forms of cooperation, because the British was the invader and the greatest enemy that must be fought.

In addition to traditionalist ulama, Abū al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī, one of India's leading Islamic thinkers, initially rejected the separation of India and Pakistan. In Mawdūdī's view, Indian nationalism and separatism by establishing a Pakistani state both have a point of weakness. Supporting Indian nationalism means that Muslims will be marginalized by the majority Hindus in all aspects. In fact, he was very impressed with Gandhi's words that

²⁷ Ibid., 103-104.

²⁸ Ibid., 106.

stated “we will get freedom with you, or without you, or in spite of you.”²⁹ In Mawdūdī’s view, this means that giving support to a majority Hindu-controlled parliament is a suicide.

Likewise, establishing Pakistan, according to traditionalist ulama, including Mawdūdī, means establishing a secular Islamic state because the initiators of the establishment of the Pakistani state are western-educated scholars. In addition to the controversial reasons for founding Pakistan above, the concerns among traditionalist ulama are also based on Jinnah’s statement that always put forward the founding of the state of Pakistan more than its system. Since the idea of seceding from India, Jinnah never once talked about the shape of the Pakistani state. This is why traditionalist ulama did not want to sacrifice the Indian Islamic masses to fight for the formation of a Pakistani state that did not have a clear system yet.

In other words, traditionalist ulama believe that Muslim League leaders exploit the name of Islam to acquire worldliness alone, not to form an Islamic state (*dār al-Islām*) based on the Qur’ān and Sunnah. This belief was ultimately evidenced by Jinnah’s remarks as president to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan:

You might belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State ... You will find that in course of time Hindu would cease to be Hindus and Muslim cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.³⁰

Nonetheless, there is a small percentage of Deobandi ulama who support the Muslim League leaders who aspire to establish the Pakistani state, among them Mawlānā Ṣabir Aḥmad ‘Uthmānī, Muftī Muḥammad Shāfi, Mawlānā Ihtishām al-Ḥaq Thanvi, and Mawlānā ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Bada’unī. They founded Jam’iyat Ulama Islam in Calcutta in 1945 and further made the organization a political party in Pakistan.³¹

²⁹ Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious, Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 42.

³⁰ Faruqi, *The Deoband School*, 121.

³¹ Barbara D. Metcalf, “Deobandis,” in John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 1 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 363.

The Role of Ulama of Pesantren Tebuireng in the Independence Movement in Indonesia

NU, founded by KH. Hasyim Asy'ari in 1926, is a non-political traditionalist organization. The organization devotes its purpose to religious social issues and educational affairs.³² However, the conditions at the time when it was founded demanded every Indonesian, including those who are active in NU, to be involved in political affairs.³³

Traditional ulama who joined NU showed a significant attitude in fighting against the rule of the Dutch colonists. They held a defensive movement called the “mental and cultural defense movement,”³⁴ through a fatwa that prohibited Indonesian Muslims, especially those living in the countryside, from wearing Dutch clothing or learning and speaking Dutch. Finally, at its congress held in Banjarmasin in 1936, NU declared that all Indonesians must fight in order to liberate their homeland (Indonesia) from all forms of threat (invaders).³⁵ This decision, according to Wahid, legitimizes the role of NU figures in Indonesia's struggle for independence, not just in fighting from a religious perspective.³⁶

The attempt to resist the Netherlands was demonstrated when NU leaders together with colleagues protested and asked the colonial government to revoke the *Guru Ordonantie* 1925 (Teacher

³² As a religious and educational social organization, the existence of NU was recognized by the Netherlands through a *rechtspersoon* (letter of approval) issued by the Governor-General and signed by G.R. Erdbrink, the Secretary General on 5 September 1929. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Sejarah Kebangkitan Islam dan Perkembangannya di Indonesia* (Bandung: Al-Ma'arif, 181), 611.

³³ M. Mansyur Amin, *NU dan Ijtihad Politik Kenegaraannya* (N.p.: Al-Amin Press, 1996), 55.

³⁴ Panitya Harlah 40 Tahun NU, *Tambah Usia, Tambah Amal Sedjarah Ringkas Nahdlatul Ulama* (Jakarta: Panitya Harlah 40 Tahun NU, 1966), 46; Read also Taufik Abdullah, “History, Political Images and Cultural Encounter: The Dutch in the Indonesia Archipelago,” *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1994), 1-24.

³⁵ Ali Haidar, *Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1994), 319-320

³⁶ Abdurrahman Wahid, “Nahdlatul Ulama dan Khittah 1926,” in Mansyur Amin and Ismail S. Ahmad (ed.), *Dialog Pemikiran Islam dan Realitas Empirik* (Yogyakarta: LKPSM, 1993), 151.

Ordinance 1925).³⁷ This regulation was quite effective as a tool for the Dutch government to control Islamic education. It was therefore seen by Muslims as an attempt to limit Islamic education.

In the view of Muslims, the protest was an attempt to stop all forms of Dutch abuse in the hope that they would be free as the majority population in carrying out their religious education, even they, especially traditional people, viewed the regulation as a wedge in carrying out their religious teachings.³⁸

The political activity of traditionalist ulama on a large scale can be seen from the commitment of the ulama in MIAI (Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia), a federation of religious organizations (Islam) established in 1937.³⁹ This organization was formed to answer all issues related to the problems faced by Indonesian Muslims and the struggle for independence. The establishment of MIAI itself was also inseparable from efforts to unite Muslims who often “quarrel” over the issue of *furū'iyah*. In addition, the establishment of MIAI was also in order to defend Muslims who were widely harmed by the colonial government, including the intervention of the colonial government on the such Muslim affairs⁴⁰ as *Guru Ordonantie* and inequality aid given to Muslims and Christians. MIAI was reorganized in 1940 and Wahid Hasyim, one of the traditionalist ulama, elected as chairman. MIAI took a stand against the existence of the colonial government.⁴¹

Related to the struggle for independence, MIAI, under the leadership of Wahid Hasyim, together with GAPI (Indonesian Political Party Association)⁴² and PVPN (Association of Government Employees) established the Indonesian People's Congress as a national committee demanding the Dutch colonial

³⁷ In *Guru Ordinantie* 1925, an Islamic religious teacher was required to ask permission to teach, make a list of student numbers and report the curriculum. Panitya Harlah 40 Tahun NU, *Tambah Usia*, 52.

³⁸ Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 337-338.

³⁹ On September 18-21, 1937, there was a meeting in Surabaya attended by KH. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, KH. Ahmad Dahlan, KH. Mas Mansur and W. Wondoamiseno and decided to form MIAI. Verslag Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia (M.I.A.I) September 1940 - Juni 1941.

⁴⁰ Benda, *The Crescent*, 80.

⁴¹ Mitsuo Nakamura, “Nahdlatul Ulama,” in John L. Esposito (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 219.

⁴² Zuhri, *Sejarah Kebangkitan Islam*, 625.

government to establish Indonesia's Parliament.⁴³ As a representative of religious organizations, MIAI asked Congress to pay attention to the interests of Muslims. MIAI also recommended that the composition of lawmakers should be consisted of Muslim majority. This proposal was submitted with the consideration that Muslims are the majority in Indonesia. MIAI also demanded that the head of state should be a Muslim, and the need for establishing a ministry of religious affairs.⁴⁴

In the era of Japanese occupation, the resistance of traditional ulama was shown by KH. Hasyim Asy'ari who opposed the Saikeirei policy, the culture bowed to the Emperor of Japan. KH. Hasyim Asy'ari was eventually imprisoned for four months, and his boarding school should also be closed.

News of the imprisonment of KH. Hasyim Asy'ari was so quickly spread in the pesantren societies, which gave birth to a protest movement among Muslim *santri* against the Japanese rulers. Some Muslim *santri*, according to Zuhri, even wanted to hold attacks on the Japanese people.⁴⁵ Wahid Hasyim, together with KH. Wahab Hasbullah, also tried to free KH. Hasyim Asy'ari through contact with the Japanese authorities in Jakarta. Finally, KH. Hasyim Asy'ari was released on August 18, 1942 and his boarding school was allowed to carry out activities as usual. Apparently, the Japanese authorities realized that the enormous influence of religious leaders could not simply be ignored.⁴⁶ Since the incident they have been very careful when going to imprison the famous *kyai*.

The Japanese realized the importance of having a federation that promotes all forms of religious organization (Islam) so that all Muslim leaders come together, can be united, and thus are more

⁴³ MPB. Manus, *Tokoh-Tokoh Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, 1993), 95.

⁴⁴ Benda, *The Crescent*, 97-98; M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 194.

⁴⁵ Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-Orang Pesantren* (Bandung: Al-Ma'arif, 1977), 169. On August 1, 1942, NU Consuls held a meeting to hold an assault and release of NU leaders captured by the Japanese. Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdatul Ulama* (Solo: Jatayu, 1985), 114-115.

⁴⁶ KH. M. Hasyim Latief, *Laskar Hisbullah Berjuang Menegakkan Negara RI* (Surabaya: Lajnah Ta'lif wan Nasyr, 1995), 11.

easily empowered to help the wishes of the Japanese nation. For this reason, the Japanese allowed the re-establishment of MIAI in 1942, even though not even a year, the federation was banned and then replaced with Masjumi (Indonesian Muslim Sjuro Assembly) which was established on October 24, 1943.⁴⁷ Wahid Hasyim realized that the purpose behind the establishment of Masjumi by the Japanese authorities⁴⁸ was to serve all forms of Japanese propaganda, aimed at mobilizing all forms of assistance for the Japanese in the form of voluntary labor or food.⁴⁹ Therefore, Wahid Hasyim invited Young Muslims, among them M. Natsir, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, Prawoto Mangkusumo and Zainul Arifin, to use the opportunity to prepare the Indonesian nation both physically and mentally to fight the Japanese nation.⁵⁰

As a traditionalist ulama, Wahid Hasyim also published an Indonesian magazine, *Soeara Moeslim*, as a tool to spread the spirit of fighting for independence.⁵¹ He also initiated to establish the BPI (Islamic Propaganda Agency) which aims to train its members to be able to make speeches, spread Islamic teachings and foster a sense of nationality as well.⁵² At an Indonesian Muslim congress in Jakarta, Wahid Hasyim said:

Colonial rulers would never think about humanity, justice and compassion. They let our children ...forget their homeland, its history, its ancestors, even its future with its god. Under the pressure of the colonial nation, our economy is very terrible. We must not act like children, but as a mature nation that can do

⁴⁷ The dissolution of MIAI in October 1943 was due to the fact that Japan suspected the establishment of MIAI as an initiative of Indonesian Muslims who were anti-colonial and non-cooperative, as stated by Aziz, "MIAI, which began in 1937 as anti Dutch organization might turn out anti-foreign again a risk the new rulers not prepared to accept." M. A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), 205.

⁴⁸ Aboebakar Atjeh, *Sedjarah Hidup KH. Wahid Hasyim dan Karangan Tersiar* (Jakarta: Panitia Peringatan alm. KH. A. Wahid Hasyim, 1957), 332.

⁴⁹ M.N. Sharief, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966), 1646.

⁵⁰ Atjeh, *Sedjarah Hidup*, 332.

⁵¹ Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-Orang Pesantren*, 189.

⁵² "KH. Abdul Wahid Hasyim," in *Ensiklopedi Islam*, Vol. 5 (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 1993), 164.

for its own people. As long as we act childishly, we will be easily deceived by sweet promises given by the colonial....⁵³

At the same time, Peta (Defenders of the Homeland) and Heiho were formed in Java and Madura with the intention of providing war troop assistance to the Japanese to counter the attack of allied forces. The establishment of Heiho is not only in Indonesia, but also in Burma and other countries.⁵⁴ This organization, finally provided military training supplies to the nation's cadres who were useful during the revolution. Capturing the idea or desire of the Japanese people to direct the masses, Wahid Hasyim, in exchange for Abdul Hamid Ono's request for *santri* to join Peta and Heiho, asked permission from the Japanese authorities to form a Muslim *santri* force named Hizbullah.⁵⁵

Wahid Hasyim also stressed that Muslims should not be sent abroad, but they, together with ulama,⁵⁶ will receive military exercises to defend Indonesian territory from allied forces. Wahid Hasyim's request to form Hizbullah was authorized by the Japanese.⁵⁷ This opportunity would actually be used to prepare Muslim *santri* against the Japanese themselves, as stated by Zuhri, "Wahid Hasyim had thought of a strategy that the idea of military training for *santri* was part of the preparation to fight the Japanese nation."⁵⁸

One of the other forms of strategy that the Japanese hope to gain sympathy from the Indonesian nation, especially Muslims, was the establishment of Shumubu,⁵⁹ or the Ministry of Religious Affairs office in charge of observing all religious affairs and Muslims. The office was headed by Colonel Horie Chozo, an architect who led the Japanese colonial government's efforts in

⁵³ Atjeh, *Sedjarah Hidup*, 340.

⁵⁴ *Soeara MLAI*, No. 20, (15 Oktober 1943); Latief, *Laskar Hizbullah*, 16.

⁵⁵ Benda, *The Crescent*, 179, R. de Bruin, *Islam en Nationalism in door Japan Bezet Indonesia 1942-1945* (Gavenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1982), 102.

⁵⁶ *Soeara MLAI*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (17 Ramadan 1362/11 September 1943).

⁵⁷ Hizbullah was officially established on 14 October 1944. Latief, *Laskar Hizbullah*, 16-17.

⁵⁸ Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-Orang Pesantren*, 195-196.

⁵⁹ To get complete information about kantor voor Inlandasche Zaken, see H. Aqib Suminto, *Politik Hindia Belanda: Het. Kantor voor Inlandsche Zaken* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986)

Java.⁶⁰ Within a few months, Shumubu employees were all from the Japanese, until the Indonesian nation (Bureau for Indonesia Affairs) under Dutch rule was allowed to work there. KH. Hasyim Asy'ari was given responsibility for its management, but his daily duties were delegated to his son KH. Wahid Hasyim.⁶¹

According to Boland, Wahid Hasyim was the one who laid the foundations for the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and establishing religious offices in each region of Karesidenan,⁶² as Wahid Hasyim stated: "Hadlaratus Shaykh (KH. Hasyim Asy'ari) and I were asked to form the office of the Central Religious Office (Shumubu). I submit an opinion to Saiko Shikikan (the Supreme Commander) that the establishment could not be possible if regional offices (branches) were not formed throughout Java and Madura. My opinion is accepted by the Japanese government."⁶³

When BPUPKI (Badan Penyelidikan Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) was established,⁶⁴ Wahid Hasyim was elected as one of the members representing traditionalist Islamic groups. Established on May 29, 1945, the body consisted of 62 members⁶⁵ and held two meetings.⁶⁶ In the two meetings, there were two opinions that developed within the body, namely the national form of Islam on the one hand and the national secular on the other, as Supomo characterized at that time "on the one

⁶⁰ U.S. Departemen of Commerce Office of Technical Service, *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia*, 226.

⁶¹ Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama*, 322.

⁶² B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 10; Deliar Noer, *Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2010), 14.

⁶³ Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-orang Pesantren*, 172.

⁶⁴ P.M. Saiko Shikikan ordered the formation Badan Oentoek Menjelidiki Oesaha-Oesaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan. See *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (30 Rabi'ul Awal 1364/15 March 1945), 2-6, and Vol. 3, No. 10 (2 Djumadil Akhir 1364/15 May 1945), 3-6.

⁶⁵ The committee consists of one Chairman, two Vice Chairmen and sixty members. *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, No. 2, tahun 3 (2 Djumadil Akhir 1364/15 May 1945), 7-9; Saifroedin Bahar et al., *Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI); Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1995), xxv-xxvi.

⁶⁶ The first meeting was held from 29 May to 1 June 1945 and the second meeting was held on 10-16 July 1945.

hand there was the opinion of religious experts who proposed the establishment of the Islamic state of Indonesia, on the other hand, the other proposal was submitted by Mohammad Hatta, which is a unitary state that will separate religious affairs with state affairs.⁶⁷

As soon as the session ended, BPUPKI members continued with the discussion. They formed a Small Committee consisting of nine members, namely: Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, A.A. Maramis, Abikoesno Tjokro Soejoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, H. Agus Salim, Ahmad Soebardja, Moh. Yamin, and Wahid Hasyim.⁶⁸ The appointment of Wahid Hasyim as a member of the committee, according to Dhofier, is a form of appreciation for his figure considered as a very potential member in bridging the pesantren society with modern Indonesian society that is expected to be formed. Wahid Hasyim was very open to making compromises so that the concept of nationality under debate would reach common ground.⁶⁹ Evidently after much discussion, this committee achieved a *modus vivendi* among Muslim nationalists and secular nationalists. They agreed with the draft opening signed by the nine members of the committee on June 22, 1945 in Jakarta. This agreement is known as the Jakarta Charter.⁷⁰

A few months after Sukarno and Hatta, on behalf of the Indonesian, proclaimed Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945, the Dutch returned to Indonesia, using the name Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), to take the government back. NICA's wishes met resistance from the Indonesian people.

⁶⁷ M. Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang dasar Republik Indonesia*, Vol. 1 (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1959), 115; Saifuddin Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945; A History of The Gentleman's Agreement Between the Islamic and The Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia" (M.A. Thesis--McGill University, Montreal, 1976), 23.

⁶⁸ The nine people who signed the Jakarta Charter were Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Achmad Soebardjo and Muhammad Yamin (nationalist Muslims), A.A. Maramis (secular Christian nationalist), and Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, Agus Salim, Wahid Hasyim (nationalist Islam groups). Saifuddin Anshari. "The Jakarta Charter" 24 and 38; Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 26.

⁶⁹ Zamakhsyari Dhofier, "KH. A. Wahid Hasyim Rantai Penghubung Peradaban Pesantren dengan Peradaban Indonesia Modern," *Prisma*, Vol. 8, No 8 (1984), 25.

⁷⁰ M. Yamin was the first member naming the results of the meeting with "Jakarta Charter" (*Piagam Jakarta*). M. Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan*, Vol. 1, 228; Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter," 25.

The most brutal war in order to maintain Indonesia's independence occurred in Surabaya on November 10, 1945.⁷¹ Known as the Surabaya war, Ricklefs mentions that "it became a national symbol of resistance."⁷² Reid also states that the war was "a model and inspiration in motivating the Indonesian people throughout the archipelago to resist Dutch and allied efforts to reimpose colonialism."⁷³

In addition to national leaders, such as General Soedirman and Bung Tomo who invited the Indonesian nation to fight the British, one of the most important factors in stirring the Indonesian nation, especially the *santri*, to fight against the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) was a fatwa set by KH. Hasyim Asy'ari, the great NU leader. The fatwa became very popular with *Resolusi Jihad*. It was accepted and spread throughout pesantren in East Java. It inspired the *santri*, including Hizbullah and Sabilillah,⁷⁴ to join forces with other nationalist groups to defend their homeland against the British and Dutch who wanted to restore their power.

The Battle of Surabaya, which is later commemorated as *Hari Pahlawan*, was a heroic event, as Wehl said: "the fanaticism and fury of Surabaya, however, were never repeated, and even when open war began between the Dutch and the Indonesian there was no fighting in the Republic to compare with Soerabaya, either in courage or in tenacity."⁷⁵

The Surabaya War is a clear historical proof of the involvement of ulama and *santri* in the revolutionary war to maintain Indonesia's independence. The *Resolusi Jihad* issued by NU, led by KH. Hasyim Asy'ari became the main trigger not only for

⁷¹ David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia* (London: GeorgeAallen and Unwim, 1948), 51.

⁷² M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300* (New York: Palgrave Macmilan, 2008), 217.

⁷³ Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974),135.

⁷⁴ The establishment of Sabilillah was the result of the Kongress Oemat Islam in Jogjakarta on November 7-8, 1945. Sabilillah, also known as Barisan Sabilillah, was established in three provinces (West Java, Central Java and East Java) and in each Karesidenan. Its headquarters were in Malang. Markas tertinggi Barisan Sabilillah Indonesia, "Makloemat Sabil ke-I," *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*, Vol. 3, No. 20 (1945), 6.

⁷⁵ Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia*, 67.

nationalists, but also for Muslims-*santri* to fulfill the call of *Resolusi Jihad*. The Muslim-*santri* were fighting at the forefront in facing allied soldiers and even they were willing to be martyred in order to maintain the independence of their homeland.

A Comparison of the Role of the Deobandi and Tebuiheng Ulama in Independence Movement in India and Indonesia

Many Western scholars, such as Wertheim, Mintz, and Dahm assume that the most dominant factor in fostering national awareness in Indonesia is the existence of Western model education provided by the Dutch government for some Indonesians since the beginning of the 20th century.⁷⁶ This assumption means not taking into account or even negating the existence of a nationalism that grows among *kyai* and *santri* who never get a chance at the Western model school. Indeed, based on the previous discussion, the emergence of the national awareness among the People of Indonesia was also inspired by the pesantren led by *kyai* and *santri*. They mostly went to Arab lands to perform hajj and study, through which then became agents of renewal after returning to their homeland, such as Haji Rasul, KH. Ahmad Dahlan and KH. Hasyim Asy'ari.

It was a fact that Haji had a very big influence on the growing awareness of the nation and state. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Middle East, particularly Mecca and Medina, attracted prominent Islamic leaders from around the world, including Muslim reformers, such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, who introduced the idea of Pan-Islamism.⁷⁷ The ritual of hajj itself reflected

⁷⁶ Wertheim stated that "Western education had the effect of dynamic upon the colonial status system." W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesia Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague W. Van Hoeven: 1966), 46. Kahin also has the same idea. Although in the book, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Kahin said that "the religious homogeneity that prevailed in Indonesia was one the most important factors in creating nationalist awareness," however, he did not state any connection or influence of *santri* who performed hajj and returned to the homeland bringing anti-colonial ideas. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), 38.

⁷⁷ The idea of Pan-Islamism was developed and propagated by Ottoman Sultans Abdul Hamid II and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. Although it failed to realize the goal of Pan-Islamism, which was to unite all Muslims under Ottoman rule, Pan-Islamism had a role in fostering the spirit of nationalism and fostering anti-colonial sentiment. Udjang Tholib, "The Causes of the Growth of Pan-Islamism

the unity and unity among Muslims, including those living in their homeland, and motivated them to fight all forms of oppression carried out by invaders who were often identified as infidels.

This was evidenced by many religious, political and social movements that occurred during the Dutch rule in Indonesia initiated and led directly by the Pilgrims. Therefore, it was not surprising that the colonial government was very afraid of their influences.⁷⁸ In line with the above statement, Hurgronje also said that “Pan-Islamism movement was strong in the Java community in Mecca; they were all touched by the same hope,” and “the most influenced people were those who at home had studied in Islamic institutions, such as pesantrens and madrasahs.”⁷⁹

The conditions behind the growth of the nationalism in India were no different from those that occurred in Indonesia. Traditionalist ulama of Darul Uloom Deoband had never received a Western education, so the opinion saying that nationalism in India arose due to the influence of Western education (English) is not necessarily justified. Before the Khilafat Movement, traditionalist ulama were already in a position against British soldiers. Khilafat Movement was a gateway that developed the nationalism of traditionalist ulama. The growth of the nationalism could not be separated from the religious values embraced by the ulama.

The role of traditionalist ulama in both India and Indonesia was significant. Although Muslims in India were a minority, Deobandi ulama, like other traditionalist ulama, rejected the concept of two nations as proposed by the Muslim League. They still held fast to the concept of *muttahiḍah qawmiyah* (united Indian nationalism); they rejected the Muslim League’s proposal to secede

and its Impact on Indian Muslims,” in Sri Mulyati et al., *Islam and Development: A Politico-Religious Renponse* (Yogyakarta: Permika Montreal & LPMI, 1977), 143; Nikki R. Keddie, “Pan-Islamas Proto Nationalism,” *Journal of Modern History*, No. 1, Vol. 41 (1969), 17-28.

⁷⁸ Raffles stated that “every Arab who comes from Mecca or every Javanese who returns from performing hajj is considered to have the character of a saint, and the lay people easily believe it; They are also often given frills as people who have supernatural powers. With such an award, it is not difficult for them to raise this country to revolt.” Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, *The History of Java*, Vol. 2, Second Edition (London: N.p., 1830), 2.

⁷⁹ Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Later Part of the Nineteenth Century* (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1931), 260-261 dan 249.

from India by establishing a Pakistani state. The rejection was the right choice for traditionalists because the use of Islamic symbols then was only a tool for the Muslim League group controlled by the bourgeois to obtain privileges. This fact came to happen when Pakistan was declared and the ideal of establishing *Dār al-Islām* was not as expected.

Their role in the formation of the state also seemed identical. The ulama from both hemispheres seemed to agree to demand to the government to give freedom for Muslims to practice religious teachings. In India, Deobandi ulama submitted conditions to the Constituent Assembly, among which are “Musalman and their religion and culture will be free.”

In Indonesia, traditionalist ulama also proposed that the phrase “with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari‘ah for its adherents” be included in the Constitution, and “the President must be a native Indonesian Muslim” to be stated clearly. This shows that the attitude of upholding religious teachings should be maintained while underlying their nationalism. So, when some Muslims in India invited secession by establishing Pakistan, it was immediately rejected by the traditionalist ulama. Likewise, among traditionalist Indonesian ulama, there was no desire to secede from the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. In fact, they were very tolerant of adherents of other religions, so that when the two proposals were then amended, traditionalist ulama accepted such condition until now.

The difference between the two traditionalist ulama of India and Indonesia is in the willingness to “cooperate” with the invaders. Deobandi ulama refused cooperation with the invaders because they had positioned them as the main enemy to fight. Thus, they closed the possibility to “cooperate.” The conditions are slightly different from what the traditionalist Indonesian ulama did. Although they still position the invaders as enemies of Muslims, there is also a strategy to “cooperate.” This “cooperation” is actually a ruse from traditional ulama so that they get facilities that are all intended against the invaders themselves. For example, the Japanese facilitated traditional circles of Muslims to establish Hizbullah and Sabilillah following the Japanese government’s training. This condition was very favorable to Muslims because they were trained so that when there was an attack on

November 10, 1945, Hizbullah and Sabilillah soldiers were already in a position to fight based on *jihād fi sabīl Allah* attitude.

Conclusion

To sum up, the role of Darul Uloom and Pesantren Tebuireng ulama in the independence movement and growing national awareness is undoubtable. Traditionalist ulama of the Darul Uloom and those of Pesantren Tebuireng both have struggled to eliminate colonization from their homeland. The Deobandi ulama fought at all costs, both weapons and through education in order to keep Islamic values from the influence of British invaders while trying their best through rebellion against the invaders. It was the same as the attitude of traditionalist Indonesian ulama. They fought the Dutch and Japanese invaders in various ways. Pesantren Tebuireng was used as a cultural fortress to keep Islamic values from being influenced by colonial culture. In addition, there was also a lot of physical resistances by the ulama that so many of them were killed or imprisoned. Their role in the formation of the state also seemed identical. Ulama from both hemispheres seemed to agree to demand to the government to give freedom for Muslims to practice religious teachings. In addition, for ulama in both countries, upholding religious teachings should be in line with, even underlie, the efforts to build national awareness, to unite nations, not to divide them. Based on the findings above, it cannot be denied that literature of Islamic Studies, nowadays, has a new perspective in looking at the role of the traditionalist ulama in the world generally, in India and Indonesia particularly.

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