Qiyās dan Istiḥsān dalam Rasionalitas Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī

Abstract

There are two conceptual terms that this paper will try to expose. The first is analogy (qiyās) and the second is istiḥsān, an analogy?like method of extrapolating jurisprudential rules. The paper will try to speak of their relationship in the light of al-Sarakhsī's rationality. In the field of Islamic jurisprudence, the two concepts are often seen as contradicting to one another. The Shafiite jurists are even of belief that using istiḥsān is legally forbidden for that would contradict the general rules of Islamic law. The paper assumes that despite general view of the jurists that istiḥsān is an equivocal method it can nonetheless be fitted into qiyâs. To show that however, the paper would inevitably re-define both qiyās and istiḥsān as proposed by al-Sarakhs?. By exploiting the ideas of al-al-Sarakhsī, the paper hopes that new lights may be shed as far as the richness of Islamic method in jurisprudence is concerned.